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MINORITY VETO RIGHTS IN KOSOVO’S DEMOCRACY  
 
                                                         BEHAR SELIMI1 
 
Abstract. The political system of Kosovo belongs to the power sharing democracies. Indeed, it has all the 
characteristics of Consociational Democracy. In addition to that, minority veto rights are absolute and go 
above the aims of this type of democracy. As it is designed in current Constitutional arrangements, even a 
single word of Constitution can’t be changed without minorities’ vote. This is different from other 
Consociational Democracies, where minorities are entitled with selected veto power only regarding their 
vital interests, but they cannot block constitutional decision-making. Since Kosovo is among the youngest 
countries worldwide, this constitutional provision can be a heavy obstacle even in the state building 
efforts of majority.  Therefore, in this article we will try to explain in depth this constitutional 
arrangement versus principles of sharing power systems and versus similar democracies in the region and 
wider. The doctrinal constitutional interpretation, descriptive and comparative methods are the main 
pillars of research methodology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The political system of Kosovo belongs to the power sharing democracies. The 
governance system in Kosovo is a distinct model of democracies with powers shared 
among the communities, namely derivative of the consensus theory. Considering the 
way of creation and the structure of power, certain authors, in an effort to find a correct 
label, call this system of governance a "community state" or a "concessional state" 
(Ramadani, 2009). These label names, which are essentially the same, are based on a 
system of governance analysis based on the consensus theory and the Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Ahtisaari's Kosovo Status Agreement.2 Although Kosovo represents a 
typical case of homogenous society,3 the document emerged from the multiethnic 
concept and hence it recommended a divided democracy.  
                                                          
1 Lecturer, PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Business and Technology, Prishtina, Kosovo 
(behar.selimi@ubt-uni.net). 
2 The plan was named after the UN Special Representative, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, 
who led the one-year (2006-2007) talks between Kosovo and Serbia. For this document see:  
https://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf  
3 Since 1981, Kosovo has been inhabited by more than 80% of Albanians, and on the eve of the war by 
88%. Since the last census of 2011, boycotted by the four northern municipalities, it turns out that Kosovo 
is inhabited by over 90% Albanian. So, unlike the states (Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), which 
represent genuine multiethnic societies, or other multi-cultural and multiethnic countries (Ireland, 
Belgium, Lebanon, etc.), in which the model of Consciousness Democracy was used.  
See:http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kosovo-population/(Available 11.04.2019)    
https://www.indexmundi.com/kosovo/demographics_profile.html (Available 11.04.2019) 
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According to Arend Ljiphart, the conscious democracy has four features: broad 
coalition government, reciprocal veto, proportional representation and segmental 
autonomy (Ljiphart, 1977, p. 25). This model of governance is recommended for deep 
ethnic, religious and cultural societies, and especially post-conflict societies. Rather 
than recommended, in the new democracies in the Western Balkans (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo), this model of power organization has 
been imposed by international actors, as of no alternative (Bieber and Keil, 2009, p. 
312). In Kosovo, some authors do not consider it a purely consensual model, as the 
representatives of the communities in the government do not have the right to veto and 
the fact that they did not have the right to veto in the initial constitutional approval; also 
because Kosovo, unlike Bosnia Herzegovina, has an individual president  (Korenica, F. 
i Doli, no date). They consider that on these issues, the Kosovo constitution accepts a 
fundamentalist approach. Indeed, the integralists do not deny cultural differences. They 
only aim to establish common public institutions irrespective of ethnic and other 
differences (Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 1999, pp. 
41-51). 
 
The first consociational mechanisms in relation to Kosovo are found in the Draft 
of the Rambouillet Accord (Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in 
Kosovo, 1999), which was accepted by the Kosovo side, but not by the Serbian side and 
then also in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in 
(UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 2001) and, finally, by the current Constitution of Kosovo 
(2008). 
 
The Constitution outlines all the provisions of the Ahtisaari's comprehensive 
Proposal on the status for Kosovo, which promote the divided power democracy, and 
even as we will see below, overcome the demands of conscientious democracy. 
 
Regarding the broad coalition government and proportional representation as 
two of the first characteristics of this model of governance, the Constitution of Kosovo 
(Article 64 and Article 96) promotes executive and legislative conscience, as it 
guarantees the participation of at least two ministers and 4 deputy ministers in the 
government and at least 20 minority community members, of whom 10 should be of the 
Serb community (Kosovo Assambly, 2008). Moreover, if the government has more than 
12 ministers, then a minister and 2 deputy ministers from the communities are added to 
the government. Proportional political representation of minorities is also applied in the 
leadership with the Assembly, as the Constitution requires the election of two vice 
presidents from the ranks of MPs representing minorities, of which one should belong 
to the Serbian minority, and the other from among the other non-majority communities.  
 
Although  Kosovo is not a typical multiethnic society, the application of the this 
model of consociational executive has produced results, especially in achieving 
common interethnic governance and more proportional representation (especially 
Serbian representation) of all communities in Kosovo. The best evidence is continual 
partipacipation of all minorities as requsted by Constitution, in each government from 
independence (2008) till actual (2019). 
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Regarding representation in public institutions, the Constitution (Article 61) is 
clear in guaranteeing the right of non-majority communities to equal representation in 
public administration bodies and public enterprises. The right of representation in the 
police service in residential areas with non-majority communities is particularly 
emphasized. The Law on Civil Servants of 2010 defines, even more clearly, the right of 
representation of non-majority communities in public administration, reserving for them 
at least 10% of public posts (Kosovo Assambly, 2010). 
 
A similar situation prevails also with proportional representation at the local 
level of government, but we will only be limited to the central level, as our main topic is 
not representation. It is worth adding to the fact that the first amendment to the Kosovo 
Constitution strengthens the position of non-majority communities, participation in 
public life and decision-making, allowing for measures or actions of affirmative politics 
(Kosovo Assambly, 2012).  
 
Regarding non-territorial autonomy, as a prerequisite of consensus-based 
democracy, the Kosovo Constitution for non-majority communities guarantees three 
types of autonomy: personal autonomy, cultural autonomy and high degree of self-
government, especially in municipalities dominated by the Serb community. In these 
municipalities, the Law on Local Self-Government, in addition to its own and delegated 
competences, also guarantees enhanced competencies in the field of education, health 
and appointment of local police commanders (Kosovo Assembly, 2008) . 
 
Like in other democracies of divided power, in Kosovo's democracy too, the 
non-majority communities are guaranteed the right of veto, which fulfills the framework 
of the preconditions of the country's economic democracy, even outweighing the current 
practices of this model, thus exacerbating more of an integration approach, though in 
favor of the minority. As we will see below, this right makes Kosovo's democracy a 
"conditioned democracy" by minorities and a barrier to the end of the process of making 
the state. Also, in comparison with similar democracies, we will see that this 
constitutional institute is currently the only one of this type, by which non-majority 
communities can block even changing of a single word of the constitution.  
   
II. THE RIGHT OF VETO OF MINORITIES IN KOSOVO 
 
The minority veto in Kosovo can be realized in two cases and within two types 
of the majority. 
 
In the first case, Article 81 of the Constitution of Kosovo recognizes the right of 
minority communities to oppose adoption of laws that may violate their vital interests. 
There are 8 types of laws, for the adoption, amendment or abrogation of which most of 
the majority MPs present and voting are needed, as well as the majority of MPs who are 
present and voting. Mostly, these laws relate to education at all levels, use of languages, 
local elections, use of symbols, creation and termination of municipalities or the 
changing of their borders, extension of municipal power, and the laws for the 
enforcement of rights of communities and their members. Moreover, these laws cannot 
MINORITY VETO RIGHTS IN KOSOVO’S DEMOCRACY 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 12 (June 2019) pp. 148-157  ISSN: 2340-9592  DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.n12.8 151 
 
be subject to a referendum either. Popular sovereignty is limited to these laws, as the 
Constitution in Article 81, Paragraph 2, does not allow them to submit to a referendum. 
This type of minority veto right is typical of the conscious democracies and, as it is 
regulated by the constitution, promotes and guarantees the protection of the specific 
vital interests of the communities. Taking into account the guaranteed number of 
community representatives in the Assembly, minority veto rights also encourage their 
mobilization against the majority. In order to protect their vital interests, they should be 
present as much as possible in the Assembly at the time of voting and cooperate with 
each other, as the voting of the aforementioned laws can only be made if the majority of 
the minorities represented in parliament are present and vote. So, the vote of the 
majority of a community does not suffice, as a majority all community representatives 
represented in the Assembly is needed. 
 
Ultimately, it can be said that this type of minority veto is in the function of 
interethnic political cohesion guaranteeing for a most advanced democracy for non-
majority communities. Fortunately, the traditional sensibility of the Albanian majority 
to non-majority communities in Kosovo has greatly influenced the veto on minority 
issues of vital interest to be accepted without any opposition, not only by the political 
representatives of the Albanian majority but also by ordinary citizens. 
 
In the second case, the Constitution of Kosovo, in Article 114, requires that 2/3 
of the members of the parliament vote for amending the Constitution, including 2/3 of 
the members of the parliament representing the non-majority communities. As the 
Assembly of Kosovo has 120 seats, of which 10 seats are guaranteed for representatives 
of the Serbian community and 10 for representatives of other non-majority 
communities, for amending the constitution, in whatever variant, at least the vote of 13 
MPs of non-majority communities are needed. In the context of Kosovo, where 
representatives of the Serb community vote en bloc and are led by the leadership in 
Belgrade, the change of the Constitution on certain matters is impossible. For worse, the 
messages of UNMIK administrators for Kosovo under Resolution 1244 and the ongoing 
manipulation of Kosovo Serbs by Belgrade's political leaders have discouraged the 
integration of Serbs into Kosovo's institutions and hence the blocking of finalization 
processes of Kosovo's statehood. Blocking of the constitutional changes for the 
transformation of the Kosovo Security Force into an Army is just one example of how a 
minority veto can block the creation of national institutions that serve the common 
interest of all communities (Baliqi, 2018). Due to the specifics of the process of building 
Kosovo's statehood and because of its character, minority veto in Kosovo can be 
considered as an example and as an obstacle to the development of democracy, or an 
obstacle to the exercise of national sovereignty. In fact, one may conclude that, in a 
constitutional aspect, the majority in Kosovo is hostage to minority interests. Unlike the 
first type, this type of veto is a political and constitutional institute imposed by 
international and controversial even today, especially by the political representatives of 
the Albanian majority (Loncar, 2015). 
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III. A REGIONAL LEVEL COMPARISON  
 
Although there are numerous examples of reciprocal vetoes globally, for the 
needs of this paper we will be focused mainly to cases in the region that can be 
compared to the case of Kosovo, including occasional refrences to the countries with 
long mutual veto experience, like Belgium. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are 
typical cases of democracies with sharing powers in which minorities are guaranteed the 
right of veto in all decisions that may affect their vital national interests. 
 
III.1.Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina represents an unsuccessful example of a consociational 
democracy, for the fact that ethnic divisions with constitutional arrangements only 
deepened (Kasapovic, 2005). The current constitution and constitutional arrangements 
of the entities are reflections of the "Dayton Accords", which ended the four year war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.4 They were meant as temporary arrangements to ensure the 
transition from a controlled democracy to a consolidated democracy (Bojkov D. Victor, 
2003). 
 
The complexity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional political 
arrangements makes it difficult for a comparative analysis, as there is still a dilemma as 
to its naming, if it is a union of states, a federation or confederation respectively, so the 
veto right at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a reciprocal veto of the of the three 
constituent ethnic communities in frame of two territorial political entities-federal 
unites. Due to this, and for the purpose of this paper, we will feel free to reduce the level 
of analysis and comparison at an entity level by calling Bosnia-Herzegovina, according 
to Professor Soren Keil , as a “ethnic federation sui generis” (Antonini, 2014). 
 
At the confederal level, parliamentary decision-making, especially legislation, is 
based on the positive majority of the votes of the present and voting MPs, provided that 
at least one third of the representatives of each entity are present. According to the 
Constitution (Article 4, Paragraph 3), any decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may 
be declared destructive to vital interests by the majority of the delegates of one or 
another entity (Parlamentarna Skupstina Bosne i Hercegovine, 2009). The Constitution 
has also established a procedure for reaching agreement, according to which a 3-
member committee (one member from each entity) requires a consensus within 5 days, 
and if that does not happen the Constitutional Court is the final authority for assessing 
the decision whether it is in contradiction with the vital national interests of the 
complaining entity or not. Although is unique, this constitutional arrangement can be 
compered with Belgium “Alarm Bell Procedure” (Kelleher, 2005). 
 
The fact that the federal constitution has not determined what the vital national 
interests are makes the right of mutual veto to be a serious obstacle to the creation of 
                                                          
4 The Dayton Agreement was reached in November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, USA, and was signed in 
December of that year. More on this agreement see: https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true  
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federal legislation. As an illustration, we are mentioning that in the period of 1997-2007 
out of 529 laws reviewed, 269 of them did not get the majority of the deputy votes due 
to the veto of representatives of either entity (Gavrić, Banović and Barreiro, 2013). As 
we have seen above, in Kosovo the situation is much more favorable, at least for two 
reasons: First, the Kosovo Constitution has explicitly defined what are the laws that 
may affect vital national interests, which are also require the vote of the majority of 
representatives of non-majority communities present and voting. Secondly, while the 
mutual veto in Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains and deepens ethnic division, the veto 
of non-majority communities in Kosovo encourages inter-minority co-operation among 
non-majority communities, and also political consensus with the Albanian majority. 
 
Regarding constitutional changes, federal constitutional arrangements require 
amendments to be voted on by 2/3 of the representatives in the federal Assembly. This 
means 2/3 of the attendees in the Chamber of Representatives and 2/3 in the Peoples' 
Chamber. Unlike the case of Kosovo, which expressly requires 2/3 of all MPs, including 
2/3 of MPs of non-majority communities. 
 
At first, the impression is that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
be easily changed, especially when realizing that the Parliamentary Assembly is 
dominated by Bosniaks and Croats, who can easily make a majority of 2/3. This 
majority can be achieved both in the representative and the people's chambers. In fact, 
in the current allocation of seats in parliament, the representative chamber has 42 MPs, 
of which the Croatian and Bosniak entity is represented by 28 representatives, and the 
Serbian entity with 14 MPs. Likewise, in the Peoples' Chamber, out of a total of 15 
MPs, 10 seats belong to Bosniaks and Croats, and 5 to Serbs. So, in both cases, the 
Bosnian and Croat entities make up a qualified majority. However, the fact that the 
constitution amendment comes as a parliamentary decision, the representatives of any of 
the entities can use the right of veto to protect national interests and hinder the change. 
The fact that so far, only one amendment has been adopted, speaks for itself.5 
 
A similar situation prevails also at the entity level, with the only difference that 
in their constitutions issues for which a veto may be used to protect national interests 
are expressly defined. Changing the constitution also requires a majority of 2/3 in the 
representative chamber and majority of each entity in the peoples' chamber. While in 
the federal entity two-thirds of the members of the constitutional Assembly are required, 
seeking the consensus of the majority of Serbian and Croatian representatives. 
 
III.2.Republic of North Macedonia 
   
North Macedonia is another case of the implementation of the concept of 
democratic democracy, which, despite all the difficulties still following, has brought 
major changes to the North Macedonian political system and has provided lasting peace 
                                                          
5 It is about the Amendment, which clarifies the powers of the Constitutional Court regarding the Brcko 
District. This amendment was adopted in 2009.  
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for as long now. This model was provided by the "Ohrid Accord",6 reached between 
representatives of the major Macedonian and Albanian political parties, with 
international mediation. North Macedonia, as well as Kosovo, has maintained the 
unitary character of the state, but with a solid degree of decentralization. In addition to 
decentralization, the agreement also imposes a proportional electoral system, which 
provides relatively proportional representation of ethnic communities, proportional 
representation in public administration bodies and public enterprises, as well as an 
application of the so-called "Badinter majority".7 In fact, here we are concerned with a 
suspensive veto of non-majority communities, which, as in Kosovo, means "a double 
majority". 
 
Unlike the case of Kosovo, where the government of an inter-ethnic coalition is 
a compulsory, the Macedonian Constitution does not require a government of a broad 
interethnic coalition, though political needs have created a practice of joint Albanian-
Macedonian governance. 
 
The minority veto, in the form of a "double majority", according to the Northern 
Macedonian constitution can be used regarding three issues. First, pursuant to Article 
69, paragraph 2, for the adoption of laws dealing with culture, use of language, 
education, personal documents and use of symbols, a majority of the votes of the 
present deputies, including the majority of votes of the present members of non-
majority communities are required. As compared to Kosovo, we see similarities with the 
same majority and the same way of voting, though not with regard to the issues to 
which this veto or majority applies. In the case of Kosovo, as we have said above, there 
is a wider range of issues that require a double majority. However, the Constitution of 
the Republic of North Macedonia, in Article 78, has established an interethnic 
committee consisting of 19 members and which, in addition to examining the issues of 
relations between communities, also decides on cases when a special procedure for the 
use of the double majority is contested. So if the majority in the parliament object to the 
application of the double majority, on the pretext that it is not part of the areas of vital 
national interest, then the interethnic committee decides with a majority of votes of its 
members. The fact that the Committee consists of 7 Macedonians, 7 Albanians, and 5 
representatives of other communities (1 Turkish, 1, Bosniak, 1 Serb, 1 Roma and 1 
Vlach) allows for the non-majority communities to consider issues of vital national 
interest and any other issue, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 
Kosovo also has a Consultative Council for Communities, though it is a consultative 
institution and within the office of the President without a constitutional power like that 
of the Macedonian inter-ethnic parliamentary committee. The Ombudsman is elected 
only on a majority of all MPs voting, though on condition that within this majority there 
must be a majority of all members of the non-majority communities. Otherwise, in 
                                                          
6 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed on 13.08.2001 ending the armed conflict between the 
National Liberation Army and the Macedonian Army.  
7 It was so named, according to the name of French lawyer Robert Badinter, who in 1991 was head of the 
Arbitration Commission for Yugoslavia and later engaged in the drafting of the Ohrid Agreement.  
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Kosovo, voting for the ombudsman is subject to a usual voting procedure, which 
requires only a majority of all deputies. 
 
Regarding the election of members of the Judicial Council, out of 15 members, 5 
members only opt for the double majority, while others are elected by the judges 
themselves. In the case of Kosovo, the Judicial Council is composed of 13 members, of 
whom 5 members are elected by the judges themselves, while 8 members are elected by 
the Assembly of Kosovo, of which 4 should be elected by MPs of non-majority 
communities. As for the members of the Constitutional Court, the Parliament of North 
Macedonia is an electoral authority and it elects its nine members. Six of them are 
elected by the majority of the votes of all MPs, and three members by most MPs, 
though the majority of the representatives of non-majority communities should also be 
included in this majority. Otherwise, in Kosovo the Assembly is only a proposing 
authority, and the appointment is made by the President. However, the proposals of 9 
members should be voted in the Assembly through the following procedure: 7 members 
are proposed with the approval of 2/3 of the present and voting MPs, while the other 2 
members are proposed with the approval of the majority of the present and voting MPs, 
though only with the consent of the majority of MPs of non-majority communities. 
 
Finally, both in the case of North Macedonia and the case of Kosovo, a minority 
veto has been applied to constitutional amendments, but with essential differences. In 
the Republic of Noth Macedonia, the constitution can be amended on 2/3 of all MPs, 
only on issues of vital interest to communities (education, language, culture, local self-
government and the like) requiring within the majority of 2/3 a majority of 2/3 of the 
non-majority communities. On the other hand, in the case of Kosovo, constitutional 
amendments are considered adopted only if they have the votes of 2/3 of all deputies, 
but on condition that these two thirds contain also 2/3 of MPs of non-majority 
communities on whatever matters (Constitution of Macedonia, 2005). 
 
So, in the case of Kosovo, the right of minority veto is absolute and unlimited on 
issues of vital interests for minorities. It can be used even against changing a single 
word in the Constitution. This power of minority right in Kosovo makes it special and 
not typical in comparison with the right of the minority veto in the case of 
consociational democracies, even with most “consolidated one, like Belgium” (Lijphart, 
1981). 
 
In comparision we can conclude that in Belgian democracy, a minority veto is 
constitutionally guaranteed only for matters of vital interest to constitutive communities 
(Belgian House Of Reresentatives, 2017). Even the so called "Alarm Bell Procedure" is 
in the function of a “soft veto power”, and can not block the constitutional changes in 
general. This procedure can only provide consensus opportunities for issues of vital 
interest. 
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IV.CONCLUSIONS 
 
A comparative analysis of minority veto rights in all three cases of study 
provides some clear and direct (explicit) conclusions, and also indirect or implicit 
implications. 
 
First, the veto of non-majority communities in Kosovo, related to legislation, is a 
strong shield of their vital national interests and in the function of democratic 
governance. The range of national interests is wider than in other cases analyzed here 
and, moreover, it is clearly defined on the constitution.  
 
Secondly, the veto of the non-majority communities on constitutional changes is 
a specific arrangement, unprecedented in consociational democracies, as in the case of 
Kosovo, the approval of any constitutional change cannot be made without the consent 
of 2/3 of the representatives of non-majority communities. 
 
Third, the veto in the constitutional changes also conflicts with the principles of 
consensual democracy, which does not allow minorities to block the governing of the 
majority, the less so disputing the sovereignty of the people. 
 
Fourthly, although Kosovo is not a typical multiethnic society, the application of 
the model of consociational democracy has produced results, especially in achieving 
common interethnic governance and more proportional representation (especially 
Serbian representation) of all communities in Kosovo. 
 
Finally, the minority veto on constitutional changes, in the way it is regulated by 
the current Constitution of Kosovo, may hinder the consolidation of the state and 
democracy. Its modification through a constitutional change procedure is impossible, 
therefore it requires a political approach, which should be aimed at the consent of its 
non-majority communities, so that their veto right is restricted to matters of vital interest 
national.  
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